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Abstract
Sensitivity to others’ actions is essential for social animals like humans and a fun-
damental requirement for any kind of social cognition. Unsurprisingly, it is present
in humans from early in the first year of life. But what processes underpin infants’
sensitivity to others’ actions? Any attempt to answer this question must solve twin puz-
zles about the development of goal tracking. Why does some, but not all, of infants’
goal tracking appear to be limited by their abilities to represent the observed action
motorically at the time it occurs? And why does their sensitivity to action sometimes
manifest itself differently in dishabituation, pupil dilation and anticipatory looking?
Solving these twin puzzles is critical for understanding humans’ earliest sensitivity
to others’ actions. After introducing the puzzles, this paper argues that solving them
may require identifying multiple, distinct processes for tracking the targets and goals
of actions.
Keywords Action · Infancy · Action understanding · Goal-tracking · Teleological
stance · Motor representation
1 Introduction
I seize little Isabel and swing her around, thereby making her laugh and breaking a
vase. Asked about this I might say, ‘The goal of my actions was not to break the vase
but only to make her laugh, of course.’ In talking about goals in this way I am not
talking about mental representations: I am talking about actual and possible outcomes
of an action, things which did or might have happened.
In general, a goal is an outcome to which an action is directed. For a process to
track a goal of an action is for how that process unfolds to nonaccidentally depend in
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some way on whether that outcome is indeed a goal of the action. (And for a subject
to track a goal is for some goal-tracking process to occur in her.)
My focus in this paper is pure goal tracking, that is, goal tracking which does not
depend on any information about mental states. Although widely ignored, pure goal
tracking is a fundamental capacity. It plausibly anchors abilities to understand others’
minds and underpins capacities to perform joint actions.
My aim in this paper is to introduce a developmental puzzle about goal tracking. I
will also tentatively introduce a conjecture which, if correct, might solve the puzzle.
My priority in discussing the puzzle, though, is to highlight reasons for thinking we
may need a new theoretical approach if we are to understand goal tracking in humans.
2 Pure goal tracking in the first months of life
When can infants first track goals to which actions are directed? Consider an ele-
gant and much-replicated experiment by Woodward (1998 study 3). In Woodward’s
paradigm, infants are presented with a scenario involving two objects, a ball and a
teddy (say). In the habituation phase, a hand enters the scene and grasps one of the
two objects, as depicted in Fig. 1. In the main phase, infants are then shown one of
two new events. The idea is to pit sameness of movement trajectory against sameness
of goal. In both new events, the locations of the ball and teddy are reversed. In one
event, the hand follows the same trajectory as before and so grasps a new object. In
the other event, the hand grasps the same object as before, which requires following
a new trajectory. If infants ignore goals and track trajectories only, then they should
find the event with the new trajectory more interesting. But if infants track the goals
of actions, then they may well be more interested in changes in the goals of actions
than in changes in movement trajectories. In that case they should find the event with
the new goal more interesting and so dishabituate more strongly to it. And this is just
what Woodward observed in both 9- and 6-month-olds. She concluded that ‘early in
life, infants begin to set up a system of knowledge of human action that has features
in common with more mature understandings’ (Woodward 1998, p. 31).
Using a manipulation we’ll consider later (‘sticky mittens’), Sommerville et al.
(2005) used this paradigm to show that even 3-month-olds can form expectations
based on the goal of an action. Apparently, then, pure goal tracking is present even in
the first months of life.
Or is it? We should distinguish goals from targets. The target or targets of an action
(if any) are the things the towards which it is directed. If the goal of an action is to kick
a particular football, this football is the action’s target. To specify a target of an action
is to partially specify one of its goals. But more is required to fully specify a goal, of
course. A goal typically involves a type of action—kicking rather than smashing, say.
It may also involve one or more manners of action—discretely, firmly, and precisely,
for example—and perhaps more besides (see Fig. 2).
For a process to track a target of an action is for how that process unfolds to
nonaccidentally depend in some way on whether that thing is indeed a target of the
action. Given the liberal way I have defined tracking a goal, a process which tracks
a target is thereby a process which tracks a goal. (The converse will often hold too,
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Fig. 1 Habituation and test stimuli from an experiment by Woodward (1998) on 6-month-olds’ abilities to
track the goals of actions. Source: Woodward et al. (2001, fig. 1)
Fig. 2 Fully specifying a goal can involve giving a type of action, a target, some manners of action, and
more
although there could be exceptions.) It is conceivable that some types of process merely
track targets: that is, such processes only ever track goals in virtue of tracking targets.
The studies considered so far are all consistent with the possibility that infants
merely track targets. To see this, suppose further research found that 6-month-olds
could not distinguish between different goals with the same target. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that they could not distinguish grasping a teddy from pushing it away. In that
hypothetical case, the findings considered so far would indicate an ability to merely
track the targets of actions.
So can infants at this age actually distinguish two actions directed to the same target
which differ in type or manner, or in some other way? To answer this question, we
would ideally have pairs of scenarios in which the target of an action is kept constant
while the type of action varies. To the extent that subjects responded appropriately
to the difference in type of action, we could be confident that they can distinguish
actions not just by their targets but also by their types. Song et al. (2005) conducted an
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ingenious experiment along roughly these lines with 13.5-month-olds. They observed
that, at this age, how long infants look at a reaching action depends on congruence
between the type of an agent’s previous action and the target of the reaching action.
Unfortunately, as far as I know, this kind of experiment has not yet been done with
younger infants. Developmental researchers rarely explicitly distinguish aspects of
goals, such as target, action type and manner.
Fortunately there are some studies which, although not intended to get at this exactly,
do bear indirectly on whether younger infants can track goals other than merely in
virtue of tracking targets of actions. Behne et al. (2005) created pairs of contrasting
scenarios. In one of their contrasts, an experimenter holds a ball out for an infant
to grasp and then either ‘accidentally’ drops it or teasingly pulls it back. So in each
case there is a goal-directed action involving the ball, but in one case the goal of the
action is to pass the ball to the infant whereas in the other case the goal is to tease the
infant. Behne et al. (2005 Study 2) found that 9-month-olds (but not 6-month-olds)
consistently and appropriately discriminated between these scenarios by, for example,
banging more when the ball was ‘accidentally’ dropped than when it was teasingly
retracted. This and other research (Ambrosini et al. 2013, discussed below) suggests
that, at least from 9 months of age, infants can indeed distinguish both the type and
target of a goal-directed action. It would be unsurprising if, in simple enough cases,
infants also showed competence in goal tracking earlier.
3 How do infants track goals?
What follows depends on the premise that infants can track goals in the first 9 months
of life, and that they do not always do so merely in virtue of tracking targets. How do
they do this?
Answers to this question can be broken into two parts. First we need to specify
a function or principle which characterises infants’ goal tracking; this is what Marr
(1982) calls a computational description. Then, second, we need a hypothesis about
how infants represent actions and goals and which processes enable them to compute
the function or apply the principle.
Start with the computational description. Step back and think about planning an
action. It is a familiar idea that we can characterise part of the process (ignoring some
important details) with an inference:
1. This outcome, G, is the goal (specification).
2. Means m is a best available way of bringing G about.
Therefore:
3. Adopt m!
It is possible to think of pure goal tracking as essentially the same inference, just
re-ordered:
1. This means, m, has been adopted (observation).




3. G is a goal of the observed action.
Planning is the process of moving from goals to means, whereas tracking goes in the
reverse direction, from means to goals. But these two have something in common:
they exploit the same relation between means and goals. In both cases, planning and
goal tracking, the means that are adopted should be a best available way of bringing
the goal about.1 This is a core insight of what Gergely and Csibra call the Teleological
Stance.2
Note that this second inference is not exactly a candidate answer to our question,
How do infants identify goals from 9 months of age (or earlier)? Instead, it provides
what Marr (1982) calls a computational description. It specifies a function. Given facts
about events and states of affairs, this function yields one or more outcomes which
are the goals of an action. Importantly, the facts given to the function could be known
without knowing which goals any particular actions are directed to, nor anything about
particular mental states.
The existence of this function is important because it shows that pure goal tracking
is possible in principle. Should we assume, further, that it is part of a correct compu-
tational description of goal tracking in the first 9 months of life (and beyond)? This
assumption is risky if you believe there is room for uncertainty about whether 9-month-
olds are only ever merely tracking targets (see Sect. 2). After all, the above inference
hinges on a relation between means and outcomes which could not be computed if
only targets were represented. But we are working from the premise that infants in the
first 9 months of life can track goals not merely in virtue of tracking targets. And as
there is no known, published alternative to Gergely and Csibra’s idea about how pure
goal tracking is possible in principle, we can only proceed by accepting it. This is why
we should take as a working assumption that the above inference provides part of a
computational description of infants’ goal tracking.
But what we want to know much more than this, of course. How do infants (and
adults, and members of other species) actually compute the function specified by this
inference? In Marr’s terms, which representations and processes are involved in pure
goal tracking?
There is no obvious reason to assume that there is just one answer to this question.
In theory, the answers could be different for infants and adults, for example. Indeed,
given the importance of goal tracking, there may be multiple kinds of goal tracking
involving different representations and processes in the first months of life.
One possibility is that we could intentionally use the inference in response to being
instructed to do so. Presented with the above inference, you and I might be tasked
with using it in a particular situation. We could observe a means and write down a
list of candidate outcomes. We might then discuss which, if any, of the outcomes
1 This is just a rough, indicative characterisation of the relation between means and goals, of course. There
are various ways of improving the characterisation and, correspondingly, of improving the second inference
above in ways which remove unmotivated limits on the range of goals this inference could be used to track
(see Butterfill 2012, pp. 845–847 for some ideas). But for our purposes, what matters is primarily the
commonality between planning and goal tracking.
2 Their are many further details of their account, which has been developed over more than 15 years. See
Csibra and Gergely (1998), Csibra et al. (2003), Csibra (2008), Csibra and Gergely (2013), Gergely et al.
(1995), and Gergely and Csibra (2003).
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the observed means would be a best available way of bringing about. And, using the
inference, we could finally reach a conclusion about the goal (or goals) of the action.
Consider the view that infants (and adults) engaged in goal tracking reason about
to which outcome a means is the best available in fundamentally the same way that
you and I would if tasked with working it out explicitly (but without writing anything
down, of course). Let us call this the Simple View:
Infants’ (and adults’) goal tracking depends on beliefs or working assumptions
concerning relations which hold quite generally between means and goals; and
they identify particular goals by making inferences from these beliefs or assump-
tions plus their observations.
Gergely and Csibra might be interpreted as endorsing the Simple View. While there is
no decisive textual support for this interpretation, they do stress continuities between
goal tracking in infants and explicit reasoning in adults (Gergely and Csibra 2003; Csi-
bra and Gergely 1998), and they describe applying the Teleological Stance as a matter
of using knowledge in drawing inferences (Csibra and Gergely 2013; Pomiechowska
and Csibra 2017). However, at another point they could be interpreted as stepping
back from the Simple View (Csibra and Gergely 2007, pp. 72–74). There is also no
clear reason for them to accept the Simple View: their overall theoretical position is
consistent with it, but does not appear to require its truth.
Irrespective of who (if anyone) endorses it, the Simple View is a good starting point
for at least three reasons. First, it involves postulating no novel psychological states,
processes or systems. (It does not entail the existence of a goal-tracking module, for
example.) Second, as just illustrated, it is a generalisation from cases in which its
claim is known to apply. Third, there are no published, suitably detailed accounts of
any alternative. So what, if anything, is wrong with the Simple View?
4 A limit on infants’ goal tracking?
One source of evidence relevant to evaluating the Simple View concerns a limit on
infants’ goal-tracking abilities. As we shall see, there is a body of evidence for the
hypothesis that, at least in the first 9 months of life, infants can only track goals of an
action they can represent motorically at the time the action occurs.
How will this evidence bear on the Simple View? Any theory of infants’ goal track-
ing should explain not only how they succeed but also why their abilities are limited
in various ways. Our confidence in the Simple View should therefore be modulated
by how well it can explain the actual limits on infants’ performance.
What evidence suggests that infants can only track goals of actions they can repre-
sent motorically? To answer this question, it is helpful to step back and first consider
something interesting about adults when they perform, and when they observe, actions.
In performing actions—stacking blocks, say—you do not look at your hand but at the
block it will pick up, or, when holding a block, at the location where it will place
a block. In acting, our eyes move just ahead of the action. Flanagan and Johansson
(2003) showed that the same pattern occurs when adults observe another agent acting.
In observing an action, the eyes move just ahead of the action. Such proactive eye
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movements have been used to measure goal tracking in adults (e.g. Ambrosini et al.
2011).
So much for adults, what about infants? When observing a hand that is approaching
some objects and about to grasp one of them, infants will, like adults, often look to the
target of the action in advance on the hand arriving there (Falck-Ytter et al. 2006). As in
adults, this proactive gaze indicates goal tracking. Critically, though, the occurrence of
this proactive gaze in infants is related to their own abilities to represent the observed
actions motorically. To a first approximation, we might say that for those infants who
are not yet able to reach, their eyes do not arrive on an object to be grasped in advance
of the hand grasping it (Kanakogi and Itakura 2011). Further, if we consider proactive
gaze for different kinds of observed actions (such as various kinds of grasping actions
or putting objects into containers), we find that infants’ gaze to the target of an action
becomes more proactive as they become able perform the particular kind of action
observed.3
Further evidence for the limit that infants can only track goals of actions they can rep-
resent motorically comes from studies which compare reaching bodies with nonbodily
events. For example, when Kanakogi and Itakura (2011) substituted a mechanical claw
for the grasping hand in their videos, they found that infants did not appear to gaze
proactively to the target of the action (see also Cannon and Woodward 2012; Adam
et al. 2016). As in other cases, infants’ goal tracking appears limited to cases in which
the actions they observed are actions they can represent motorically.4
This rough statement of the limit needs refining. The actions observed by infants
in the studies mentioned so far are probably faster and more fluid than any the infants
themselves could produce. We will also see evidence that 3-month-olds can track the
goals of reaching actions although they are not capable of reaching (but only of pre-
reaching), and that they can do so even for actions like reaching over a high barrier
which they could not do at all (Skerry et al. 2013). Indeed, we will even see evidence
that 6-month-olds can track the goals of actions (specifically, phonetic gestures) they
are wholly unable to perform (Bruderer et al. 2015). How, then, could infants’ goal
tracking be limited to actions they can represent motorically?
The answer has two parts. First, the limit we are considering is not about capacities
to perform actions but capacities to represent them motorically. These are connected,
of course: to some extent, limits to perform actions are useful proxies for limits to
represent actions motorically. But that is a background methodological issue. Second,
representing an action motorically need not involve representing every aspect of the
action accurately. Aplasic individuals may represent observed manual grasping actions
3 On whole-hand and precision grasping actions, see Ambrosini et al. (2013, p. 6): ‘infants’ ability to
perform specific grasping actions with fewer fingers directly predicted the degree with which they took
advantage of the availability of corresponding pre-shape motor information in shifting their gaze towards
the goal of others’ actions.’ On actions involving placing objects into containers, see Cannon et al. (2012)
who studied 12-month-olds. It is also possible to find links between action ability and goal tracking using
habituation rather than anticipatory looking (e.g. Sommerville and Woodward 2005).
4 This inference depends on the independently testable, and so far untested, assumption that infants do not
typically represent the movements of mechanical claws motorically. Of course there is room for uncertainty
on exactly which features explain differences in infants’ responses to bodies and nonbodily events (compare
Biro, Csibra, and Gergely 2007, p. 307) and whether these features are linked to motor processes. We also
know that some robot actions do trigger some motor activity in adults (Gazzola et al. 2007a).
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motorically as if they were grasping actions performed with the foot or mouth (Gazzola
et al. 2007b). Likewise, ordinary individuals who have experience of pressing a pedal
with their feet to grasp an object may represent observed manual grasping actions as
if they involved the feet (Triberti et al. 2016). Representing an action motorically may
therefore involve distorting the means while capturing the goal with a higher degree
of accuracy.
To be more precise about the limit under consideration, let us say therefore that
two actions are similar enough in a context if they are either both of the same kind
(for example, both reaching actions) or else similar enough that the differences make
no difference for the purposes of goal tracking in that context. For example, reaching
and pre-reaching are similar enough in many contexts. The limit under consideration
is then this: infants in their first 9 months of life can only track the goals of an action
if they can represent a similar enough action motorically at the time the action occurs.
The evidence considered so far takes the forms of correlations between infants’
abilities to perform and to track the goals of actions. What happens if you intervene
on infants’ abilities to act?
An ingenious way to enhance infants’ abilities to act was invented by Needham et al.
(2002). They put ‘sticky mittens’ on 3-month-old infants and allowed them to play
with objects. These infants spent more time visually and manually exploring novel
objects than others without such mittens (see further Needham et al. 2017). Having
established the mittens’ efficacy, a group of researchers went on to examine whether
3-month-olds who had worn the mittens show enhanced abilities to track the goals
of others’ actions (Woodward 2009). To this end, they used Woodward’s paradigm
mentioned above to test goal tracking in a group of 3-month-olds who had played
wearing the mittens, and in a further group who had not done so. Only infants who
had played wearing the mittens showed evidence of goal tracking. While this result
can of course be interpreted in many ways, it is another indication that infants can only
track the goals of an action if they can represent a similar enough action motorically.5
One potential objection to this study concerns the fact that playing with the mittens
not only enhanced the infants’ abilities to act but also gave them more time observing
actions. Could it be observation of action (including one’s own) rather than perfor-
mance that matters? To address this issue, subsequent studies have compared what
happens when infants are enabled to perform a new action with what happens when
they merely observe the new action being performed (for example, Sommerville et al.
2008; Gerson and Woodward 2014; Bakker et al. 2015). Taken together, the results of
such studies indicate that it really is enhancing infants’ abilities to act (and thereby
their abilities to represent actions motorically), rather than merely allowing them to
observe, which influences their goal-tracking abilities.
But what exactly can we conclude about limits on infants’ performance? The limit
under consideration is about infants only tracking the goals of actions they can repre-
sent motorically at the time the action occurs. None of the evidence considered so far
bears on when infants must represent actions motorically. We need studies in which
infants’ abilities to act are impaired.
5 See further Skerry, Carey, and Spelke (2013). These researchers used a different test for goal tracking,
one which involves distinguishing more and less awkward means of achieving a goal. Although their
interpretation differs from that of Woodward (2009), the differences are not directly relevant here.
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Bruderer et al. (2015) temporarily impaired 6-month-olds’ abilities to act in one
of two ways by getting them to suck either a tongue-constraining dummy or a lip-
constraining dummy. How would these two kinds of constraint affect infants’ abilities
to track the goals of actions for which the tongue was critical? The researchers found
that the infants’ goal tracking was impaired by the tongue-constraining dummy only.
Given the assumption (on which we have been relying throughout) that intervening on
infants’ action abilities has an effect on their abilities to represent actions motorically,
their observations suggest that intervening on infants’ abilities to represent particular
goals motorically may have an immediate effect specifically on their abilities to track
actions directed to similar goals.
Or does it? Like many groundbreaking studies, Bruderer et al. (2015)’s leaves
alternative possibilities open. One particularly pressing issue is whether temporarily
impairing infants’ abilities to perform tongue actions really altered their ability to
represent those actions motorically. In adults, tying the hands appears to have effects
related to effects of direct intervention on the motor cortex using TMS (see Costantini
et al. 2014 and Elsner et al. 2013 on Ambrosini et al. 2012). This suggests that tying
the hands does indeed impair abilities to represent manual actions motorically. There
is no comparably direct evidence on whether constraining infants’ tongues similarly
impairs their ability to represent tongue actions motorically.
In this section I have reviewed evidence concerning a limit on infants’ goal tracking.
As they acquire or lose new abilities to act, whether through ordinary develop-
ment or experimental intervention, so their goal-tracking abilities are correspondingly
enhanced or impaired. This suggests that, at least in the first 9 months of life, infants
can only track goals of actions when they can represent a similar enough action motor-
ically at the time the action occurs.
Of course we are not forced by the available evidence to accept that infants’ goal
tracking is so limited. One response would be to withhold judgement given that the
evidence on what happens when infants’ abilities to represent actions motorically
are impaired is extremely sparse by comparison with the richer body of evidence
concerning adults (Costantini et al. 2014; Pazzaglia et al. 2008). Another response
would be to accept the evidence but interpret it differently. Rather than a limit on goal
tracking, the evidence could be interpreted as suggesting that 9-month-olds simply find
goal tracking slightly harder when they cannot represent observed actions motorically.
As things stand, either of these responses is probably reasonable. Even so, the available
evidence is at least enough to justify asking what would follow if infants can only track
goals of actions they can represent motorically at the time the action occurs.
Why might goal tracking in infants be limited in this way? One possibility is that the
Simple View is wrong: infants’ goal tracking is not a consequence of making inferences
from general beliefs and observations but instead involves motor representations and
processes only (see Sect. 5 below). But could the limit be explained without rejecting
the Simple View? On the Simple View, goal tracking is a matter of thinking and
reasoning about the best means to perform an action (see Sect. 3). A proponent of
the Simple View might allow that acquiring abilities to act, or to represent actions
motorically, provides new knowledge of means-ends relations, which in turn enhance
goal-tracking abilities (compare Skerry et al. 2013, p. 18732). But this is not sufficient
to explain the why infants can only track goals of actions they can represent motorically
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at the time the action occurs. A proponent of the Simple View would have to suppose,
further, that access to this new knowledge is impaired by momentary inability to
represent actions motorically. While not impossible, this would be a bold conjecture
for which there is currently little direct evidence. So if infants really can only track
goals of actions they can represent motorically at the time the action occurs, we will
probably need an alternative to the Simple View.
5 Themotor theory of goal tracking
Consider a very small-scale action such as dipping a brush into a can of paint, placing
a book on a shelf or cracking an egg. Attention to the ways such actions unfold reveals
that, often enough, early parts of the action anticipate future parts in ways that cannot
be determined from environmental constraints alone. For instance, how you grip a
book or an egg may depend on what you are going to do with it (see, for example,
Kawato 1999; Cohen and Rosenbaum 2004). This anticipatory control of grasp, like
several other features of action performance (see Rosenbaum 2010, chapter 1 for more
examples), is not plausibly a consequence of mindless physiology. It likely involves
representations concerning how actions will unfold in the future.
Such representations are thought to feature in processes which are planning-like in
that they involve computation of means-ends relations (Grafton and Hamilton 2007)
and in that they enable satisfying relational constraints on the selection of means
(Rosenbaum et al. 2012). Representations of actions which feature in planning-like
processes and thereby characteristically play a role in coordinating very small-scale
actions are what I refer to as motor representations.6
This way of characterising motor representations is deliberately nonspecific. Motor
representations are to action what visual representations are to vision. In both cases,
the motor and the visual, the representations are theoretical posits. We can be confident
that they exist to the extent that we are confident that a theory positing them is broadly
correct. But for many purposes we need not commit to the details of any particular
theory.
How are motor representations relevant to understanding goal tracking in infants?
According to a review by Sinigaglia and Butterfill (2016), a body of evidence supports
the hypothesis that tracking the goals of others’ actions can be achieved motorically.7
That is, there are cases of goal tracking in which the only representations involved
are motor representations. (They use the term ‘functional goal ascription’ for tracking
goals.) Whereas those authors focus on adults, their hypothesis may also be relevant
to understanding goal tracking in infants.
This hypothesis rests on some background assumptions about the control of action.
First, I follow Jeannerod (2006) and others in rejecting the view that all motor rep-
6 On what motor representations are and why they are necessary, key sources include Prinz (1990), Wolpert,
Ghahramani, and Jordan (1995), Jeannerod (2006), and Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008). On how motor
representations might differ from intentions, see Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014). For philosophical back-
ground, see Bach (1978) on effective representations.
7 This hypothesis is not original to them, of course. They draw on a wide range of sources including
Rizzolatti et al. (2001) and Gallese et al. (2004) among others.
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resentations specify only bodily configurations, joint displacements and end states.
Instead some motor representations specify outcomes to which actions are directed,
such as the grasping of a particular handle or the transporting of a given object. Second,
some motor processes involve computing means from ends and generating sensory
expectations concerning the effects of actions (e.g. Wolpert et al. 2003). Third, mul-
tiple means–ends computations can occur simultaneously, or at least rapidly enough
for action preparation to involve selection on the basis of multiple means-ends com-
putations (e.g. Wolpert et al. 1998).
The Motor Theory of Goal Tracking (as I will call it) is the upshot of combining
these background assumptions with a further discovery and a principle. The discovery
concerns action observation. When observing an action, motor representations and
processes can occur in the observer which are, or closely resemble, those which would
occur in her if it were her rather than the actual agent who was acting (Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia 2010, 2016). This discovery forces us to answer a question. What
are those motor representations and processes doing there? Since the observer is not
acting, they might appear redundant; but since they are costly, they cannot actually
be redundant. An answer to this question is suggested by a principle which we have
already encountered (in Sect. 3). It is the principle that goal tracking is planning
in reverse. Perhaps motor processes occur in action observation partly because the
means-ends computations they enable are the core part of a goal-tracking process.
But how could goal tracking work according to the Motor Theory? In action obser-
vation, possible outcomes of observed actions are represented. There may be few or
no constraints on which outcomes are initially represented motorically given that mul-
tiple means–ends computations can occur simultaneously (or almost simultaneously).
Each represented outcome triggers a planning-like process like that which would occur
in preparing to perform an action. As in action performance, this process generates
predictions concerning bodily configurations, joint displacements and sensory effects
associated with actions. These predictions can be compared with the observed action.
The representation of the outcome is weakened to the extent that these predictions are
inexplicably unmet. The result is that the only only outcomes to which the observed
action is a means are represented strongly (see Fig. 3).
Note that the Motor Theory of Goal Tracking is not an alternative to the idea that
goal tracking depends on computing which outcomes the observed means are best
ways of bringing about (see Sect. 3). The Simple View and the Motor Theory do not
differ at all concerning which relation between means and goals is to be computed
in pure goal tracking. The two differ only on which processes are responsible for
identifying which outcome or outcomes the observed means is a best available way
of achieving.8
8 One consequence is that there may be no conflict between the Teleological Stance (Gergely et al. 1995;
Csibra and Gergely 1998) and the Motor Theory of Goal Tracking, providing we interpret the Teleological
Stance as providing a computational description of pure goal tracking. Contrast Gredebäck and Melinder
(2010, p. 205) who assume that any process characterised by the principle specified by the Teleological
Stance would be distinct from motor goal-tracking processes. I am suggesting that the principle specified by
the Teleological Stance provides a computational description for a motor goal-tracking process. (The idea




Fig. 3 How motor processes might enable cases of goal tracking in which the only representations involved
are motor representations Source: Sinigaglia and Butterfill (2016, fig. 1)
It is helpful to distinguish three claims which could be associated with The Motor
Theory of Goal Tracking:
1. Goal-tracking could, in principle, be implemented motorically.
2. In humans, some goal-tracking processes involve only motor processes and rep-
resentations.
3. *Goal-tracking is impossible without motor processes and representations.
The third claim is not part of the Motor Theory. Nor is it supported by any of the
evidence considered here (compare Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010, p. 271; and Gallese
and Sinigaglia 2011). Indeed, given that human adults could explicitly step through
the inference specified in Sect. 3, it seems clear they can track goals independently of
being able to represent them motorically.
Any proponent of the Motor Theory of Goal Tracking should allow that there
are at least two kinds of goal-tracking process, one motoric and one which involves
theoretical deliberation. This duality could be advantageous. Motor processes operate
at the speed of action and can exploit kinematic cues whose significance observers may
be otherwise unaware of; they are ideal for tracking goals as an action unfolds, enabling
proactive gaze. By contrast, theoretical deliberation enables greater flexibility in goal-
tracking as it is not limited to cases where the observed actions can be represented
motorically.
Earlier (in Sect. 4), we were confronted with the question, Why might goal tracking
in infants in the first 9 months of life be limited in that they can only track goals which
they can represent motorically at the time of observing an action? This is the question
which led us to consider the Motor Theory of Goal Tracking. But how does it help?
Consider a conjecture about development:
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The Developmental Motor Conjecture In the first 9 months of life, all pure goal
tracking is explained by the Motor Theory. Other goal-tracking processes emerge
later in development.9
This conjecture, if true, would neatly explain why goal tracking in the first months of
life is limited. There’s just one small problem. It does not seem quite true to say that
infants’ goal tracking is limited by their abilities to represent actions motorically.
6 Twin developmental puzzles
The Developmental Motor Conjecture (from Sect. 5) was introduced in connection
with a candidate limit on infants’ goal tracking in the first 9 or so months. As we saw,
there is inconclusive but significant evidence for the hypothesis that infants in their first
9 months of life can only track the goals of an action if they can represent a similar
enough action motorically at the time the action occurs. However, a breakthrough
discovery by Gergely et al. (1995) made much earlier than the research so far reviewed
appears to conflict with any such hypothesis about limits.10
Their experiment involves transformations of two-dimensional spheres only. The
12-month-old infants in the test group of this study were habituated to a sequence of
events which adults would likely spontaneously interpret as involving goal-directed
action (Heider and Simmel 1944; see Fig. 4). Specifically, the small ball’s movements
are directed to reaching the larger ball. This involved leaping a barrier. Following
habituation, infants saw a new film with no barrier to leap over. One group of infants
saw a ‘new action’: that is, a different movement trajectory but one which was plausibly
directed to the same goal. Another group of infants saw the ‘old action’: that is, the
same movement trajectory but one which, in the absence of the barrier, was not so
plausibly directed to the same goal (see Fig. 5). Now if infants were considering the
movements only and ignoring information about the goal, the ‘new action’ (movement
in a straight line) should be more interesting because it is most different. But if infants
are taking goal-related information into action, the ‘old action’ might be unexpected
and so might generate greater dishabituation. And this latter possibility is exactly what
Gergely and Csibra found.
These findings have been extensively replicated and extended (see Csibra 2003;
Gergely and Csibra 2003 for reviews). Importantly for our purposes, much the same
findings can be observed with younger, 9-month-old infants (Hernik and Southgate
2012) and even 6.5-month-old infants (Csibra 2008). Related observations indicate
that even 3-month-olds may be capable of extracting goal-related information from
displays involving simple geometric shapes (Luo 2011).
Combined with the evidence about limits mentioned earlier (see Sect. 4), these
findings give rise to a puzzle about development. If we take all the available evidence
9 This conjecture is inspired by Gredebäck and Falck-Ytter (2015), Hunnius and Bekkering (2014) and
Woodward and Gerson (2014) among others. These authors have interestingly different theoretical positions
and would be unlikely to endorse the conjecture, for good reasons (see below). However, they all provide
considerations which motivate considering this conjecture.
10 A study by Southgate et al. (2008) is sometimes used to argue that infant goal tracking is insensitive to
biomechanical features. However, note that the stimuli used in this study involve a grasping hand.
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Fig. 4 Illustration of a movie used in habituation for the test group: the small ball moves over the barrier
and stops by the larger ball. Source: Gergely et al. (1995, fig. 1b)
Fig. 5 Following habituation, infants were shown one of the two movies represented above. In a, the small
ball moves directly to the large ball; in b the small ball takes the same trajectory taken when there was a
barrier between it and the larger ball. Source: Gergely et al. (1995, fig. 3)
at face value, we arrive at this view. For infants in the first 9 months of life, some, but
not all, of their goal tracking is limited by their abilities to represent actions motorically
in this way: they can only track the goals of an action if they can represent a similar
enough action motorically at the time the action occurs. The puzzle is to understand
why this might be. We cannot explain it by appeal to the Simple View (from Sect. 3):
that predicts no such limits. And we cannot explain it by appeal to the Developmental
Motor Conjecture (from Sect. 5), which predicts inescapable limits.
In fact, the evidence on goal tracking is more puzzling even than this. Daum et al.
(2012) created a modified version of Woodward’s paradigm which allowed them to
measure two different responses to a single scenario, anticipatory looking and dishabit-
uation. Their modified paradigm involved cartoon fish moving in ways which infants
(and probably adults too) are unlikely to represent motorically. They found evidence
for goal tracking by 9-month-olds in their dishabituation responses but not in their
anticipatory looking. In fact, the 9-month-olds’ anticipatory looking indicated that
they expected the fish to move along the same path irrespective of any more distal
goal it might have; and it was only the 3-year-olds (not the 1- or 2-year-olds) whose
anticipatory looking indicated goal tracking.11
11 Gredebäck and Melinder (2010) also found evidence of goal tracking in six-month-olds’ pupil dilation
but not their anticipatory looking. Their paradigm needs separate consideration because it involves human
actions (unlike Daum et al. (2012)’s) but not actions of a kind which the infants could themselves perform.
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An initial response to these discrepancies may be to think that anticipatory looking
is especially hard because it requires such rapid identification of a likely goal. However,
as we have seen (in Sect. 4), there are other cases in which infants do indicate goal
tracking in their anticipatory looking (e.g. Kanakogi and Itakura 2011; Ambrosini et al.
2013). Note also that invoking the Motor Theory also cannot explain the discrepancies.
After all, a key virtue of the Motor Theory is that it makes predictions about the
timing of goal tracking: specifically, goal tracking should be as far ahead in time of
an observed action as motor preparation would be ahead in time if the goal-tracker
were not observing but performing the action. So where the Motor Theory explains
performance, we would ordinarily expect goal tracking to be detectable in anticipatory
looking.
Any theory of pure goal tracking in infants must therefore solve twin puzzles.
Why does 9-month-olds’ goal tracking sometimes manifest itself in dishabituation (or
pupil dilation) but not anticipatory looking? And why is some, but not all, of their
goal tracking limited by their abilities to represent actions motorically at the time of
observing an action?
7 Two responses to the puzzles
My primary aim is to draw attention to the twin developmental puzzles about goal
tracking. However, it is perhaps worth considering steps towards a possible solution,
even if only to illustrate how hard solving the puzzles would be. Let me outline two
possible lines of response, one based on prior art and the other novel.
Infants who can track the goals of a contracting and expanding, self-propelled
ball are not representing the ball’s actions motorically. The Developmental Motor
Conjecture must therefore be false. Infants’ goal tracking in the first 9 months of
life is too flexible to be explained by the Motor Theory. Instead we must allow that
these infants, like adults, can arrive at conclusions about the goals to which an action
is directed via theoretical deliberation, just as adults can.12 Consequently we must
reject the hypothesis about limits. Since these infants can deliberate theoretically
about goals, it must be false that they can only track the goals of an action if they
can represent a similar enough action motorically at the time the action occurs. And,
as we saw (in Sect. 2), the evidence does not force us to accept the hypothesis about
limits because it is broadly compatible with the weaker hypothesis that goal-tracking is
merely facilitated by motor processes and representations. Accepting only this weaker
hypothesis would allow us to hold on to the Simple View and dissolve the first puzzle.
And this response could be further developed to answer the second puzzle by invoking
a conjecture about how theoretical deliberation concerning goals typically speeds up
as children age, only gradually becoming fast enough to support anticipatory looking.
So the first line of response.
This first line of response has the virtue of taking many studies of proper goal
tracking in infants at face value. But what if it turns out that the hypothesis about
limits is actually correct? Is there an alternative response, one consistent with the
12 Csibra and Gergely (2007) provide an elegant, detailed articulation of roughly this argument.
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possibility that infants under 10 months of age can only track the goals of an action if
they can represent a similar enough action motorically at the time the action occurs?
Targets are formally distinct from goals (see Sect. 2). Further, there could be a
kind of process which merely tracks targets. That is, it would count as a goal-tracking
process only in virtue of tracking the targets of actions. The computational description
of such a process must differ from the computational description we considered for
goal-tracking processes (see Sect. 3). After all, that computational description hinges
on a relation between means and outcomes where the means is a best available way
of bringing the outcome about—no such relation holds between antimate things and
their targets. A process which tracked targets only would therefore differ substantially
from a propergoal-tracking process.
A process which tracks targets only could be useful. Imagine becoming aware of
a hostile presence. In the very first moments, you may already have taken a view
about who the target of her actions is on the basis of her movements and which
way she is facing. Perhaps it will take longer to more fully identify the goals of her
actions—whether, for example, her knife is for attacking or coercing; perhaps you will
never discover what her goals were. But information about the target alone could be
enough to spring into action, heorically placing yourself between the hostile and her
target.
Consider a guess about infants:
Target Tracking Guess When infants in the first 9 months of life might appear to
be tracking goals which they are unable to represent motorically, they are merely
tracking targets.
If this guess were correct, there would be no conflict with evidence for the hypothesis
about limits. This would make the first puzzle merely apparent. It would be an artifact
of failing to distinguish merely tracking the target of an action from proper goal
tracking. Suppose, further, that processes by which infants in the first 9 months of life
track the targets of objects do not enable anticipatory looking. Together with the guess,
this further assumption suggests a solution to the second puzzle. The appearance of
dissociations between dishabituation (or pupil dilation) and anticipatory looking may
be due to the fact that, in infants (at least), target-tracking processes, unlike goal-
tracking processes, do not enable proactive gaze. This, then, is a second response to
the twin developmental puzzles.
As far as I know, we cannot yet tell whether the Target Tracking Guess is correct or
incorrect. We cannot yet tell that it is incorrect because few experiments are designed to
distinguish proper goal tracking from mere target tracking; and those which do so dis-
tinguish also measure abilities to represent actions motorically (as we saw in Sect. 2).
But the Guess is not merely wild speculation. For there is evidence of processes in
adults which merely track targets. This is provided by research on perceptual animacy,
the detection by broadly perceptual processes of animate objects and their targets.
To illustrate, consider a groundbreaking experiment by Gao et al. (2009, experiment
1). Adults were shown a display which contained some moving circles. In some cases
the circles moved independently of each other, but in other cases there was a ‘wolf’
circle which chased a ‘sheep’ circle with varying degrees of subtlety. The adults’ task
was simply to detect the presence of a wolf. Gao et al. (2009) established that adults
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can do this providing the chasing is not too subtle. In further experiments, they also
showed that adults’ abilities to perceptually detect chasing depend on several cues
including whether the chaser ‘faces’ its target (‘directionality’) and how directly the
chaser approaches its target (‘subtlety’).
Some discussions of perceptual animacy confound it with goal tracking proper.13
This would imply that perceptual animacy effects depend on the identification of a
best-available-means relation (see Sect. 3). While not impossible in principle, this
seems unlikely given three considerations. First, perceptual animacy effects can be
elicited when almost no information about goals other than targets is provided. Second,
the perceptual detection of animacy appears to depend on cues and heuristics which
would be detrimental if deployed in proper goal tracking. And, third, detection of
animacy appears to be a broadly perceptual phenomenon since it depends on areas of
the brain associated with vision and influences how perceptual attention is allocated
(Scholl and Gao 2013) irrespective of your beliefs and intentions (van Buren et al.
2016). By contrast, there is no reason to suppose that any kind of proper goal tracking
is a broadly perceptual phenomenon. So the triggers, computational description and
cognitive architecture of perceptual animacy all nondemonstratively suggest that it is
not goal tracking proper. I shall therefore assume instead that perceptual animacy is a
broadly perceptual process which merely tracks targets and is therefore distinct from
the motor or theoretical processes of proper goal tracking characterised by the Motor
Theory and the Simple View.
Perceptual animacy and motor goal-tracking processes can be distinguished using
the method of signature limits. Where a response is due to perceptual animacy, it
should be subject to signature limits concerning trajectories and directionality. For
example, where a chaser could have, but does not, take a reasonably direct approach
to her target, perceptual animacy does not enable target detection; and likewise if a
chaser inexplicably faces too far away from her target (Gao et al. 2009). By contrast,
where a response is due to motor goal-tracking processes, it should be limited by the
observer’s abilities to represent actions motorically (see Sect. 4). In short, different
signature limits ensure that conjectures about perceptual animacy and motor goal-
tracking processes generate distinct testable predictions.
Could it be that behaviours in 9-month-olds which appear to manifest proper goal
tracking but do not involve motor processes are all a consequence of perceptual ani-
macy? Such a conjecture may appear tempting for several reasons. Infants in the first
year of life can perceptually detect animacy.14 And because Gergely et al. (1995)’s
effect appears to depend on cues to animacy (Schlottmann and Ray 2010; see further
Hernik et al. 2014), an interpretation of this particular scenario in terms of perceptual
animacy is currently plausible.
13 Schlottmann and Ray (2010) and Scholl and Tremoulet (2000) claim that perceptual animacy is a matter
of, or involves, tracking goals. Scholl and Gao (2013) conflate research on perceptual animacy and on goal
tracking. And Rochat et al. (2004, p. 367) hold that perceptual animacy is underpinned by ‘teleological
inferences’.
14 Or so results from Rochat et al. (2004, 1997) indicate. Note that Rochat et al. (2004) appear to claim
that infants under eight months of age do not detect animacy. However, drawing this inference from their
results would be unjustified given that their stimuli are bare chasing stimuli without cues to animacy which




This conjecture also generates readily refutable predictions. Whatever ability under-
pins Gergely et al. (1995)’s effect also appears to enable infants to track unseen
constraints on movement (Csibra et al. 2003; Csibra 2003). The conjecture there-
fore implies that tracking unseen constraints could be a consequence of perceptual
animacy, although no research to date suggests this. Further, Gergely et al. (1995)’s
effect involves violations of the proposed limit on subtlety where barriers are present.
The conjecture therefore implies that the subtlety limit is more complex than exist-
ing research indicates, so that including barriers in stimuli would allow perceptual
animacy effects even where the angle of approach to a target is large.
8 Conclusion
There is a developmental puzzle about goal tracking in the first 9 months of life. On the
one hand, an impressive body of evidence from various researchers using a range of
manipulations and measurements points to the conclusion that infants’ goal tracking
is limited: these infants can only track the goals of an action if they can represent a
similar enough action motorically at the time the action occurs (see Sect. 4). On the
other hand, an extensive body of evidence, which is standardly taken to indicate proper
goal tracking in infancy, points to the conclusion that no such limit exists (see Sect. 6).
We must reject one of these conclusions.
A further, related development puzzle concerns dissociations in performance as
measured by different response types (see Sect. 6). It is not just that infants manifest
goal tracking in one type of response (e.g. pupil dilation) but not another (e.g. antic-
ipatory looking; Gredebäck and Melinder 2010). There is at least one case in which
dishabituation appears to manifest goal tracking whereas anticipatory looking indi-
cates tracking statistical regularities (Daum et al. 2012).
I propose three steps towards solving these twin puzzles. While at least two incom-
patible responses to the puzzles are consistent with the available evidence (see Sect. 7),
there should be broad agreement on these steps.
The first step is the least controversial and theoretically most basic. We should distin-
guish proper goal tracking from mere target tracking. This distinction matters because
evidence that infants– can track the targets of actions should not automatically be taken
to support the conclusion that they are capable of proper goal tracking (see Sect. 2).
An important second step is to recognise that there may in fact be distinct processes
for proper goal tracking and mere target tracking, at least in adults. Mere target tracking
can be achieved perceptually thanks to perceptual animacy (see Sect. 7), while proper
goal tracking can be achieved motorically (see Sect. 5).
Merely distinguishing processes is of little use unless doing so also allows us to
generate testable predictions. Fortunately the different processes are associated with
signature limits. For instance, tracking targets though perceptual animacy depends
on heuristics like directionality and subtlety (see Sect. 7). And, of course, motor
goal-tracking processes are limited to cases in which actions similar enough to those
observed can be represented motorically (see Sect. 5). Thanks to these and other dis-
tinguishing performance characteristics, predictions can be derived from conjectures
about the particular process or processes which underpin sensitivity to features of
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action. The third step, then, is to contrast the predictions of multiple conjectures about
the kinds of processes involved in tracking others’ actions.
Taking these three steps appears necessary if we are to understand the development
of goal tracking. In adults, we can distinguish a proper goal-tracking process which
involves only motor representations and processes (Sinigaglia and Butterfill 2016)
from one which involves theoretical deliberation; and these can both be distinguished,
arguably, from the broadly perceptual target-tracking processes which underpins per-
ceptual animacy effects. These goal- and target-tracking processes may have different
developmental trajectories. Understanding these is key to solving the twin develop-
mental puzzles.
One (of several) candidate solutions to the puzzles would be this conjecture:
In the first 9 months of life, all proper pure goal tracking is explained by the
Motor Theory. Other pure goal-tracking processes emerge later in development.
Further, a mere target-tracking process is also present in these infants. And
appearances that these infants’ pure goal-tracking abilities are not limited by
what they can represent motorically are misleading: they are due to mistaking
mere target tracking for proper goal tracking.
While it is not yet known whether this conjecture is true or false, it is worth considering
partly because it can be developed in ways which generate readily testable predictions
(see Sect. 7). The conjecture also has another virtue. Sensitivity to others’ actions is
so fundamental to social cognition and joint action that it is likely to depend on a
rich mix of many kinds of processes. We need ways to identify these processes, to
distinguish their limits and to understand their synergies. This is why distinguishing
motor processes which support proper goal tracking from perceptual animacy which
supports mere target tracking matters. But regardless of whether this conjecture turns
out to be right, what seems more certain is that solving the twin developmental puzzles
about pure goal tracking is essential if we care at all about the abilities which underpin,
among other things, understanding others’ minds and social interaction.
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